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In addition to the authorities cited at page 23 of their 
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appellants have discovered additional authorities. Those 
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Heritage Mountain case, applied to the findings of the trial 
court, is dispositive of the appeal. The appellants would have 
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appeal had Heritage Mountain been decided previously. In fact, 
the major focus of the appeal would have been on the Heritage 
Mountain decision. The appellant relies further upon the case of 
Meier v. Ross General Hospital. 445 P. 2d 519 (Cal. 1968) as 
authority for this court to consider the effect of the Heritage 
Mountain case on this appeal. 
Very truly yours, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
(uA 
Keith W. Meade 
KWM/da 
cc: M. Richard Walker 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DIEHL LUMBER TRANSPORTATION, 
INC. , 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs 
GLEN J. MICKELSON dba 
GLEN7 S SERVICE COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
GLEN J. MICKELSON dba 
GLEN' S SERVICE COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
HERITAGE CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, COMTEL, a Utah 
corporation, AMERICAN WEST 
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and FAR WEST 
SAVINGS & LOAN, 
Third-Party 
Defendants, 
and 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party 
Defendant and 
Appellant 
Case No. 890179-CA 
Argument Priority 14. b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from Judgment, Third Distr: 
Salt Lake County, Honorable James 
ict Court, 
Sawaya 
M. Richard Walker 
M. Richard Walker & Associates 
4685 South Highland Drive, #202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorney for Respondent Mickelson 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South,#500 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorneys for Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Authorities ii 
Statement of Jurisdiction and 
Nature of Proceedings Below 1 
Statement of Issues 1 
Relevant Statutes 2 
Statement of the Nature of 
the Case and Statement of Facts 4 
Summary of the Argument 6 
Argument 9 
I. The Lien Foreclosure Action with Respect 
to Zions was Untimely 9 
II. Mickelson' s Foreclosure Action Against 
Diehl Lumber was Untimely 21 
III. Mickelson' s Work was not Lienable 24 
IV. The Utah Mechanics Lien Statute 
is Unconstitutional 27 
Conclusion and Relief Sought 38 
Addendum 
Lien i 
Nunc Pro Tunc Order ii 
Minute Entry, June 29, 1987 iv 
Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law v 
Judgment xii 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: 
AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development, 714 P. 2d 
289 (Utah 1986) 7,21,23 
Ballard v. Lawyers Title of Ariz. . 552 P. 2d 455 
(Ariz.App. 1976) 23,24 
Barry Properties v. Fick Brothers Roofing Co. • 2 77 Md. 
15, 353 A. 2d 222 (1976) 27,36 
Beach & Adams Builders v. Northwestern Bank. 220 S. E. 2d 
414 (N.C. 1975) 16,20 
Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos. 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 
P. 2d 517 (1957) 18 
Central Coast Electric v. Mendell. 672 P. 2d 1224 
(Or. App. 1983) 15 
Chicago Lumber Co. v. Merrimack River Sav. Bank. 
52 Kan. 410, 34 Pac. 1045 (1893) 20 
Daniger v. Hunter. 251 P. 2d 353 (Cal. 1952) 26 
First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen. 631 P. 2d 919 
(Utah 1982) 29,35 
Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) 27,32 
Graff v. Boise Cascade. 660 P. 2d 721 (Utah 1983) 29 
H. A. M. S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska. Inc. , 
563 P. 2d 258 (Alaska 1977) 29,37 
Houser v. Smith. 56 Pac. 683 (Utah 1899) 23 
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. New Mexico Environ. . et al. , 
637 P. 2d 38 at 42 (N. M. 1981) 19 
King Brothers v. Utah Drv Kiln. 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 
P. 2d 254 (1962) 26 
McGrew v. Industrial Commission. 85 P. 2d 608, 610 
(Utah 1938) 34 
Mickelson v. Craigco. 99 U. A. R. 21 (Utah 1989). . . . 18,19 
ii 
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. . 416 U.S. 600 (1974) . . . 27,32 
North Georgia Finishing. Inc. v. Di-Chem. Inc. , 
419 U.S. 601 (1975) 27,32 
Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Vallev Dairy Ass' n. , 
657 P. 2d 1279 (Utah 1982) 24,25,26 
Preece v. Preece. 682 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1984) 13,14 
Roberts Invest. Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Pr. Co. , 
22 Utah 2d 105, 449 P. 2d 116 (1969) 17 
Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons' Sup. , 
362 A. 2d 778 (Conn. 1975), vacated and remanded 423 
U.S. 809 (1975) (for determination of whether decision 
was based on federal or state grounds), reaffirmed, 
Conn. 365 A. 2d 393 (1975); cert. den. 429 U.S. 889 
(1976) 31,32,34,36 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. . 395 U.S. 337 
(1969) 27,32 
Spielman-Ford. Inc. v. Hanson's, 379 F. Supp. 997 (D.Ariz) 
aff'd w. o. opin. 417 U.S. 901 (1974) 32,35 
Totorica v. Thomas. 397 P. 2d 984 (Utah 1965) 18,19 
Tripp v. Vauahn. 747 P. 2d 1051 (Utah App. 1987) 24 
Union Tank & Pipe Co. v. Mammoth. 25 P. 2d 262 
(Cal. App. 1933) 23 
United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Cottonwood Properties. 
Inc. . 750 P. 2d 907 (Ariz. App. 1987) 23 
Statutes: 
U. C. A. §38-1-1 27,28 
U. C. A. §38-1-3 35 
U. C. A. §38-1-5 35,38 
U. C. A. §38-1-7(3) 29,30 
U. C. A. §38-1-11 (1987) 2,6,7,9,14,20,21,22,31 
U. C. A. §78-2-2(j) 1 
iii 
Other Authorities: 
53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics Liens §350 16 
Article 1, Section 7, Utah Constitution . . . .1,8,27,34,35 
Black' s Law Dictionary (4th Ed. ). . ' 19 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States 
Constitution 1,2,8,27,32 
Rule 5, U. R. C. P 13 
Rule 7, U. R. C. P 13 
Rule 14, U. R. C. P 12 
Rule 64A, U. R. C. P 33 
iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This matter was appealed from a final judgment in the Third 
District Court entered after a trial to the court in the Third 
District Court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding. The 
judgment was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
U. C. A. §78-2-2 (j). The appeal was poured-over to the Court of 
Appeals by the Supreme Court pursuant to an order dated March 24, 
1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in determining that Mickelson' s 
lien foreclosure action was commenced in a timely manner with 
respect to Diehl Lumber Transportation? 
2. Did the trial court err in determining that Mickelson' s 
lien foreclosure action was commenced in a timely manner with 
respect to Zions First National Bank? 
3. Did the trial court err in its entry of a Nunc Pro Tunc 
order? 
4. Did the trial court err in determining that the work 
performed by Mickelson was lienable? 
5. Is the Utah Mechanic' s Lien statute unconstitutional on 
its face as a taking of property without due process, violative 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution? 
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RELEVANT STATUTES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.C.A. §38-1-11 (1987): 
38-1-11. Enforcement - Time for - Lis 
Pendens - Action for debt not affected. 
Actions to enforce the liens herein 
provided for must be begun within twelve 
months after the completion of the original 
contract, or the suspension of work 
thereunder for a period of thirty days. 
Within the twelve months herein mentioned the 
lien claimant shall file for record with the 
county recorder of each county in which the 
lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of 
the action, in the manner provided in actions 
affecting the title or right to possession of 
real property, or the lien shall be void, 
except as to persons who have been made 
parties to the action and persons having 
actual knowledge of the commencement of the 
action, and the burden of proof shall be upon 
the lien claimant and those claiming under 
him to show such actual knowledge. Nothing 
herein contained shall be construed to 
impair or affect the right of any person to 
whom a debt may be due for any work done or 
materials furnished to maintain a personal 
action to recover the same. 
Art. 1, Sec. 7, . Utah Constitution: 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution: 
Section 1. Citizens of the United States. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
2 
State deprive anv person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
AND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action presents, as set forth in the Statement of 
Facts, the determination of whether Mickelson is entitled to 
foreclose a mechanic7 s lien against property owned by Diehl 
Lumber Transportation. 
1. This action revolves around claims related to a 
building located in Murray, Utah, referred to as the "Comtel" 
building. (Finding of Fact 1, R. 580. ) 
2. The building was owned and constructed by Heritage 
Corporation. Mickelson was hired by Heritage. (Findings of Fact 
2, 5, R. 580, the Contract is at R. 41. ) 
3. The construction lender was American West Mortgage. 
(R. 360.) Zions First National Bank (Zions) and Diehl Lumber 
Transportation, Inc. (Diehl) held their interest through American 
West Mortgage' s trust deed. (Tr. 270. ) Diehl was the record 
owner of the property when the action was commenced. (Finding of 
Fact 12; R. 441. ) 
4. This action commenced on October 28, 1986 when Diehl 
filed a complaint seeking a restraining order to prevent 
Mickelson from entering the Comtel building and removing property 
which Mickelson had installed. (R. 4. ) 
5. Mickelson answered and counterclaimed, alleging that 
(para. 6) he retained title to the materials he had installed 
because he had not been paid. Mickelson prayed for authority to 
enter the building to remove the materials he had installed and, 
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in the alternative, for a money judgment. (R. 11-14. ) 
6. On November 12, 1986, Mickelson filed a "Motion for 
Writ of Replevin," alleging that he "has installed various items 
of personal property and fixtures into [the Comtel building]." 
(R. 21. ) Mickelson' s motion was granted and the order signed on 
December 26, 1986. (R. 75, 76. ) The Prejudgment Writ of 
Replevin issued on March 24, 1987. (R. 84, 85. ) 
7. On June 12, 1987, Mickelson filed, without prior leave 
of the court, a (proposed) third party complaint seeking for the 
first time to foreclose a mechanic' s lien against Heritage, 
Comtel, American West and Zions. (R. 97, second cause of 
action). 
8. Mickelson' s lien was recorded on August 21, 1986 and 
states that "Last Labor/Material provided on or about: 
05/15/86." No dollar amount is set forth in the lien. (R. 107. ) 
9. On June 18, 1987, Mickelson filed a "Motion for Leave 
to File Third Party Complaint. " Mickelson' s Notice of Hearing 
set the motion for a June 29, 1987 hearing. (R. 116, 119.) On 
June 29, 1987, the court entered a minute entry stating that 
"Based on the Defendant's Motion Court orders the Defendant's 
Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint be continued to 
July 6, 1987 at 2:00 p.m." (R. 126.) No hearing occurred on 
July 6, 1987. On November 25, 1987, the court entered a Nunc Pro 
Tunc Order reflecting that Mickelson's motion "came on regularly 
for hearing on the 29th day of June, 1987" and that Mickelson "is 
hereby granted [sic] to amend and file the Third Party Complaint 
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herein, effective as of the date of filing. ,f (R. 250, 251. ) 
This nunc pro tunc order was entered ex parte without any motion 
and without notice. It was never served on other counsel. 
10. On February 1, 1988, Mickelson filed a "Motion for 
Leave to Amend [its] Counterclaim" against Diehl to "conform the 
Counterclaim to the issues raised, namely the lien foreclosure 
action against the plaintiff, Diehl Lumber Transportation, Inc." 
(R. 312. ) The motion was granted by order dated February 23, 
1988. (R. 330. ) 
11. After a trial, the court denied Mickelson7s claim that 
he had retained a valid security interest (Conclusion of Law 12, 
R. 585) in the items he installed, but ordered that Mickelson was 
entitled to foreclose his lien as against Zions and Diehl. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The arguments of appellants are summarized as follows: 
1. Mickelson7 s lien foreclosure action with respect to 
Zions was untimely. Mickelson did not include any demand in his 
original Counterclaim to foreclose the lien which he filed with 
respect to the property. Not until November 25, 1987 was any 
order of the court entered permitting Mickelson to commence a 
lien foreclosure proceeding against Zions Bank. Pursuant to 
U. C. A. §38-1-11, the commencement of the lien foreclosure 
proceeding with respect to Zions was untimely. Mickelson' s lien, 
filed in August of 1986, stated that the last work for which a 
lien was claimed was performed on May 15, 1986. The last work 
that Mickelson billed for with respect to the project was 
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performed on May 19, 1986. Mickelson testified at trial that he 
performed no work after June 2 or 3, 1986 and that on June 10, 
1986 he determined not to go back to the project because he was 
unpaid. Under the principles of AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree 
Development, 714 P. 2d 289 (Utah 1986) Mickelson7s right and 
remedies under the lien statute were extinguished prior to the 
date of the Order which permitted the filing of the Third Party 
Complaint. 
2. Mickelson7 s lien foreclosure action against Diehl 
Lumber was untimely. At the time the litigation was commenced, 
Diehl Lumber was the record owner of the property. Diehl Lumber 
was not included in the foreclosure action when it was originally 
commenced by Mickelson. As the fee owner of the property, 
Diehl' s interest could not be foreclosed without it being made a 
party to the foreclosure causes of action. No claim of lien 
foreclosure was made against Diehl until a motion for leave to 
amend Mickelson7 s counterclaim was filed with the court on 
February 1, 1988. At the time this motion was made, the 
limitation period provided in §38-1-11 had long since expired and 
any further claims by Mickelson with respect to its lien rights 
were extinguished. Because the action against Diehl was 
untimely, Mickelson is not entitled to foreclose his lien against 
the property. 
3. Mickelson7 s work was not lienable. The undisputed 
testimony of Mickelson at trial was that the items which he 
installed at the property were readily removable and were not a 
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permanent part of the property. At the outset of the 
proceedings, Mickelson was granted a Prejudgment Writ of Replevin 
with respect to the materials he had installed, clearly 
manifesting the court's belief and Mickelson's representation 
that the property was personalty and not a permanent part of the 
property. The trial court erred in determining that any of the 
work performed or materials installed by Mickelson was lienable. 
4. The Utah mechanic' s lien statute is unconstitutional on 
its face. At the time of the transactions relevant to this 
action, the Utah mechanic' s lien statute -did not require that the 
lien be verified as to its truthfulness or that an amount claimed 
be set forth in the lien. There is no provision in the lien 
statutes for any meaningfully prompt hearing either prior to or 
subsequent to the attachment of the lien. The recording of a 
mechanics lien constitutes a constitutionally cognizable taking 
of property under process of the law. Because of these due 
process deficiencies, the recording of a lien under existing Utah 
law results in a taking of property without due process, 
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE LIEN FORECLOSURE ACTION WITH RESPECT TO ZIONS WAS UNTIMELY. 
This court' s review of this issue requires the consideration 
of two factors: a) from what date does the limitation in §38-1-
11 begin to run, and b) in light of the nunc pro tunc order, what 
was the date of commencement of the lien foreclosure action 
against Zions. 
The trial court found, (F. F. 6, R. 580), that "Mickelson 
provided labor . . . until June 10, 1986, at which time work was 
suspended by Mickelson . . . [based upon non-payment]." The 
trial court concluded that Mickelson suspended work on June 10, 
1986, and that "the last work for which a lien was filed was done 
. . . on or about May 19, 1986, although other work was performed 
up to June 10, 1986." (C. L. 4, R. 583, 584) 
The following facts are marshalled with respect to these 
issues: 
1. The lien, which was signed on August 21, 1986, shows 
last work on May 15, 1986 and makes no reference to any 
suspension of work. (R. 107. ) 
2. Mickelson' s affidavits filed with the court prior to 
trial stated the following: 
(a) In a September 18, 1987 affidavit, (R. 173) that 
he performed "labor and materials and services in connection with 
the electrical work through and including the 15th day of May . . 
. " and that (para. 5, R. 174) "I suspended work on the project on 
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or about the 15th day of May, 1986, the thirty day period 
thereafter did not expire until the 14th day of June, 1986. " 
(b) On September 20, 1987, the owner's (Heritage's) 
president filed an affidavit prepared by Mickelson' s counsel 
stating that he knew that Mickelson suspended work based on non-
payment on approximately May 15, 1986. (R. 176. ) 
(c) In a memorandum dated November 3, 1987, (R. 188), 
Mickelson asserted that work was suspended on May 15, 1986. 
(d) In a March 17, 1988 motion and memorandum (R. 344, 
355) for summary judgment, Zions advanced the May 15 date as 
entitling it to summary judgment under 38-1-11. 
(e) In a responsive affidavit dated April 14, 1988, 
Mickelson changed his prior testimony and stated he had 
"researched records" and that he did work on May 19, 1986, and 
that he "waited until June 10, 1986 to determine his course of 
action," and until June 10, 1988, he fully intended to proceed 
with completion. (R. 419. ) (The May 19, 1986 invoice referred 
to was prepared in July, 1986. (Tr. 36. )) 
3. At trial, Mickelson testified that the last work he 
performed on the job which he charged anyone for was done on May 
19, 1986. (T. 36. ) He testified that after that date he did 
some work he did not charge for. That work consisted of moving 
or changing an outlet for a Xerox machine for the tenant and his 
installing some elbows and fittings in preparation for wiring an 
exterior sign for the tenant (but he did not connect the sign). 
(T. 38, 63. ) Mickelson testified that the last free work he did 
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was on June 2 or 3, 1986 (T. 32), and that he did no work after 
that date and never completed his work. (T. 41, 42. ) 
4. On June 12, 1987, Mickelson filed with the clerk a 
proposed "Third Party Complaint," which was the first pleading to 
assert a claim for lien foreclosure. (R. 97.) A "Motion for 
Leave to File Third Party Complaint" was filed on June 18, 1987. 
(R. 116. ) A hearing was set by Mickelson7 s counsel on the motion 
for June 29, 1987. (R. 119.) The court's minute entry for June 
29 (R. 126) shows that the hearing was continued at Mickelson's 
request to July 6, 1987. There is nothing in the record to 
reflect that a hearing was ever held on the motion. In a letter 
to the court dated November 24, 1987, Diehl' s former counsel told 
the court that he had advised Mickelson' s counsel in June 1987 
that "Diehl would not oppose the Motion . . . " (R. 252. ) No 
written stipulation was ever filed to permit the amendment to 
Mickelson' s answer to include the Third Party Complaint and no 
order was signed by the court until the trial judge signed a Nunc 
Pro Tunc Order dated November 25, 1987 which stated that 
Mickelson "is hereby granted [sic] to amend and file the Third 
Party Complaint herein, effective as of date of filing. " (R. 
250. ) 
In summary, the relevant dates are as follows: 
May 13, 1986 last electrical work invoiced, 
invoice number 1578, (T. Exh. 2, 
also at R. 403. ) 
May 15, 1986 last date of work stated in 
Mickelson lien (R. 107); date 
Mickelson suspended work as set 
out in pre-trial affidavits. (R. 
174. ) 
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May 19, 1986 
May 19-June 3, 1986 
August 21, 1986 
June 12, 1987 
June 18, 1987 
June 29, 1987 
November 25, 1987 
date on invoice for installation 
of brace for water pipe, billed 
one hour - total bill $37.11, no 
evidence it was related to 
electrical work (Tr. 74, 88. ) 
Mickelson testified that his last 
work of any nature would have 
been around June 2 or 3. (T. 32, 
1. 12, 13. ) No work after May 19 
was billed for. 
lien recorded. (R. 107) 
(proposed) third party complaint 
filed (R. 97) as against Zions, 
first pleading to ask for lien 
foreclosure. 
motion for leave to file a third 
party complaint filed (R. 116.) 
hearing date for motion (R. 119) 
and minute entry (R. 12 6. ) 
nunc pro tunc order signed (R. 
250) allowing Third Party 
Complaint. 
(a) The Third Party Complaint was not "filed" until 
November 25, 1987, a date more than 1 year after work was 
suspended. 
Because Mickelson did not file his Third Party Complaint 
within ten (10) days of his Answer and Counterclaim, he was 
required to obtain leave of court by motion to file the Third 
Party Complaint. Rule 14, U. R. C. P. There is no evidence the 
motion for leave to file the third party complaint was ever 
heard, and no order was made on the motion until the nunc pro 
tunc order of November 25, 1987. 
"A motion nunc pro tunc is used to make the record speak the 
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truth; it may not be used to correct the court' s failure to speak 
. . . In other words, the function of a nunc pro tunc order is 
not to make an order now for then, but to enter now for then an 
order previously made. " Preece v. Preece, 682 P. 2d 298 at 299 
(Utah 1984). 
The foregoing authority reveals two fatal flaws with respect 
to the November 25, 1987 order entered by the trial court. 
First, Preece reflects the requirement that a motion for the 
nunc pro tunc order be made. No motion was made in this case for 
its entry, and no notice was ever given that Mickelson would 
apply to the Court for such an order, nor was notice given of its 
entry, contrary to Rules 5 and 7, U. R. C. P. In fact, there was 
never any notice of any type to other counsel that any nunc pro 
tunc matters were before the court. The order should be stricken 
on this basis alone. 
Second, even if a motion for a nunc pro tunc order was 
properly before the court, the motion could not have been 
properly granted because as stated in Preece the purpose of nunc 
pro tunc orders is to make the record speak, to enter now for an 
order previously made. Implicit in this is the need for a prior 
order to have been made, i. e. , for the court to have spoken. In 
Preece, there was evidence that the court had actually made an 
oral order which was to become final on signing. In this 
action, there is no evidence that the court ever made any order 
on June 29 or July 6, 1987, except to continue the hearing date. 
It is also clear that Diehl did not stipulate to the order. Its 
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counsel simply indicated that it "would not oppose" the motion. 
As such, "a previously made order did not exist and therefore 
did not afford the court the right to employ the nunc pro tunc 
device. " (Preece, 682 P. 2d at 300. ) 
Based on the foregoing authority as applied to this action, 
the November 25 order permitting the Third Party Complaint could 
not have been effective prior to the time that it came on for 
hearing, which it apparently never did, until November 25, 1987, 
when the order was entered ex-parte. At that time, Judge Sawaya 
had no authority to enter a nunc pro tunc order. 
The November 25, 1987 date was well after the statute of 
limitations had expired. On this basis alone, the action 
against Zions should be dismissed. 
(b) Without regard to the nunc pro tunc order, the 
foreclosure action was untimely. 
Even if the foreclosure action is deemed commenced prior to 
November 25, 1987, it was still barred by U. C.A. §38-1-11. 
The trial court concluded that "the last work for which a 
lien was filed, was done by the [Mickelson] on or about May 19, 
1986, although other work was performed up to June 10, 1986." 
(C. L. 5, R. 584) The trial court also concluded that Mickelson 
"suspended work11 on the project on June 10, 1986, because he was 
not being paid. (C. L. 4, R. 584). 
The conclusions which were made are not supportable, either 
in law or in fact, for the following reasons. 
i) Last work on May 19, other work to June 10, 1986. 
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Initially, there was no evidence at trial that Mickelson 
performed work up to June 10. Mickelson himself testified that 
he did no work of any kind after June 2 or 3. (T. 32) 
The trial court' s decision is unsound for a second reason-
none of the work done after May 15 was lienable. Mickelson (an 
electrician) testified that on May 19 he installed a support 
bracket for a water pipe. After May 19, he changed an outlet to 
accommodate the tenant7 s Xerox machine, even though the outlet he 
had previously installed was the type called for in the plans. 
(T. 91) He also installed (but did not connect) some fittings on 
the tenants exterior sign. (T. 38) Mickelson gave no dates for 
this work. Mickelson did not bill for this work, and kept no 
records of when it was actually done. Work, to extend the time 
for either the filing or foreclosing of a lien, must itself be 
lienable. It must also be in furtherance of the original 
agreement and not new work. Central Coast Electric v. Mendell, 
672 P. 2d 1224 (Or. App. 1983). The work which Mickelson did after 
May 15 was done for the tenant and not the owner. (T. 91) There 
was no evidence that it was part of the original agreement. It 
was work so trivial in nature that even Mickelson did not expect 
to be paid for it. Central Coast, supra. 
Another reason why Mickelson should be bound by the May 15 
date lies in the invoices themselves. Mickelson' s contract (Tr. 
Exhibit 1) was with Heritage. Mickelson's last two invoices were 
not to Heritage, but to Comtel, the tenant. (Invoices 1588 and 
1578, part of Trial Exhibit 2. ) Because the last work (May 13 
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and May 19) was not part of the original contract, which was with 
Heritage, it could not extend the time for foreclosing the lien. 
Finally, the lien itself states the last work for which a 
claim of lien is made was done on May 15, 1986. A lien and the 
foreclosure proceeding are proceedings in rem. 53 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Mechanics Liens §350. They are not directed against people, but 
property. The significance of this is highlighted in this case, 
where neither Zions or Diehl had any contractual obligation to 
Mickelson nor did they have any involvement in his work. The 
obligation, if any, lies in the property itself. Mickelson' s 
lien states that the last work for which a lien was claimed was 
performed on May 15. It is that lien (R. 107) that is being 
foreclosed on. It is only that lien claim that was before the 
court. Neither Mickelson nor the court could re-write the lien 
at time of trial. If Mickelson wanted to claim a lien for work 
done after May 15, he could have filed an amended lien, so long 
as it was done within the time permitted by law. He did not. 
Mickelson is bound by his lien. In Beach & Adams Builders 
v. Northwestern Bank, 220 S. E. 2d 414 (N. C. 1975), the builder 
filed a lien which stated that it had provided last work on 
November 16, 1972. In its complaint to foreclose the lien, the 
builder alleged that its actual last date of work was December 
12, 1972. The defendants argued by summary judgment that the 
lien claimant should be bound by the contents of its lien, and 
that the complaint was untimely. In response, the lien claimant 
filed an affidavit stating that the lien reflected a clerical 
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error and that the last work was indeed done on December 12. The 
court of appeals observed that there was nothing on the lien to 
suggest to a title examiner that an error had been made and 
stated that "Here, no 'fair construction' of the claim as written 
would indicate to the reader that the last furnishing was 
actually several weeks later than that actually shown on the face 
of the Claim of Lien." (220 S.E. 2d at 414.) The court went on 
and recognized an exception in instances where there was an 
obvious error determinable from the lien itself, and concluded 
that ". . . barring an obvious error, easily discernible to the 
title examiner, the plaintiff is bound by the date stated on his 
Claim of Lien. " Id. at 414. Mickelson' s attempt at trial to 
amend the lien to assert a later date of last work or to claim 
that he actually suspended work at an even later date is nothing 
more than an untimely effort to amend his lien. Roberts Invest. 
Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Pr. Co. , 22 Utah 2d 105, 449 P. 2d 
116 (1969). Mickelson should be bound by the lien he filed, 
including the date of last work. 
Mickelson' s statement in his lien that his last work for the 
lien was performed on May 15 is factually and legally correct. 
The trial court' s conclusion that the last date of work was June 
10 is not supported either in law or by the record. 
ii) The trial court's conclusions on "suspension" are also 
incorrect. 
Regardless of when the last date of work was, it is clear 
that Mickelson must rely on "suspension" to avoid an untimely 
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foreclosure. 
Prior to trial, Mickelson' s testimony with regard to when he 
suspended work changed to avoid summary judgment on the issue of 
the statute of limitations. (R. 344, 355, 419. ) Initially, 
Mickelson said in an affidavit that he suspended work on May 15. 
(R. 174, 176, 188.) After Zions sought summary judgment based on 
this date, Mickelson changed his testimony and in a new 
affidavit, moved the date back to June 10. (R. 419. ) In 
Mickelson's own mind, "suspension" was a variable term, adaptable 
to suit any procedural need. 
Long prior to June 10, 1986, Mickelson stopped working and 
keeping track of work on the project because he was not being 
paid. He called the owner on a regular basis about payment (T. 
160, 161.) On May 22, 1986, the owner advised the contractors 
that the takeout loan had not closed. (Tr. Exh. 5, T. 160. ) 
When June 10 arrived, and the loan still had not closed, 
Mickelson told the owner he would do no more. (T. 163.) 
Suspension, if it occurred at all, occurred long before June 
10, 1986. Suspension is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (4th 
Ed. ) as " . . . a temporary stop . . . " It is not a permanent or 
final departure. 
Two Utah cases have addressed the issue of suspension, 
Totorica v. Thomas, 397 P. 2d 984 (Utah 1965) and Mickelson v. 
Mickelson must be deemed an "original contractor" in this 
action. U. C. A. §38-1-2. Mickelson's contract was with the 
owner, Heritage. Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 
P. 2d 517 (1957). 
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Craicrco, 99 U. A. R. 21 (Utah 1989). In each case, the lien 
claimant came back and completed its work after suspending work. 
In each case the Court recognized that if a lien claimant 
suspends work but comes back later to complete it, that the lien 
claimant is not required to measure its time for filing or 
foreclosing its lien from the date of suspension, but can wait 
until after completion of its work. Implicitly, the cases also 
define suspension as a stopping coupled with a restarting of 
work. This definition is entirely consistent with the usual 
definition of suspension, as found in Black' s, supra. 
Appellants have found no other state lien statutes which use 
the term "suspension" as a measuring stick for time. The term 
"suspension" is, however, used in other statutes. For example, 
in Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. New Mexico Environ. , et al. , 637 
P. 2d 38 at 42 (N. M. 1981) the term is referred to as "nothing 
more than a temporary cessation. " 
It was clear and undisputed from the testimony at trial that 
Mickelson did no work directed to his contract with Heritage 
after May 15. (The May 19 installation of the water pipe brace 
cannot reasonably be construed as electrical work. ) The evidence 
points only to the conclusion that Mickelson' s last work was on 
May 15th. 
Any other interpretation ignores both Totorica, supra, and 
Mickelson, supra, as well as the normal meaning given to 
" suspension. " 
A purely subjective standard, which the trial court 
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apparently adapted, should not be used to define "suspension" for 
several reasons. Initially, it would render §38-1-11 subject to 
whatever imagination was necessary to avoid an untimely filing or 
foreclosure. Chicago Lumber Co. v. Merrimack River Sav. Bank. 52 
Kan. 410, 34 Pac. 1045 (1893). This imagination factor is amply 
highlighted in this case by Mickelson' s change in testimony 
regarding suspension. Secondly, a subjective standard defeats 
the notice aspect of liens. As discussed in Beach & Adams 
Builders, supra, it is important that title examiners be able to 
determine the status of liens from the record. A title examiner 
should not have to call a lien claimant and ask if his lien 
really means what it says. In this case, Mickelson' s lien stated 
last work on May 15, 1986. It did not refer to suspension. As 
such, people viewing title and the lien were entitled to believe 
that foreclosure had to begin no later than May 15, 1987. As 
discussed in Point IV, infra, any extension of the lien through 
judicial interpretation would only weaken the notice and further 
highlight the constitutional deficiencies in the Utah lien 
statute. 
(c) As discussed in Point II, infra, Mickelson' s 
foreclosure against Zions was also ineffective because Diehl, the 
fee owner, was not a party to the original foreclosure claims. 
Zions had no interest in the fee (except as a beneficiary under a 
trust deed) at the time the foreclosure was commenced. 
In summary, because the filing of the third party complaint 
could not have been effective prior to November 25, 1987, it was 
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clearly untimely. Even if the nunc pro tunc order is deemed 
valid (which it is not), it would not have been effective prior 
to any legally supportable limitation date under §38-1-11. 
Mickelson' s claim against Zions was commenced late and at a time 
when the lien had already dissolved. AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree 
Development, 714 P. 2d 289 (Utah 1986). 
II 
MICKELSON' S FORECLOSURE ACTION AGAINST DIEHL 
LUMBER WAS UNTIMELY. 
The controlling statute on the issue of the untimeliness of 
Mickelson's action against Diehl Lumber is U. C. A. §38-1-11. 
Pursuant to the appellant7 s obligation to marshall facts, 
the following facts are presented: 
1. At the time the action was commenced, Diehl Lumber was 
the owner of the property. (F. F. 12, R. 581. ) 
2. The Complaint and the Amended Complaint filed by Diehl, 
in paragraph 4, alleges that Mickelson filed a lien on May 7, 
1986. (R. 8, this is not the August 21 lien which was 
foreclosed a trial. ) This allegation was admitted by Mickelson. 
(R. 11, Answer and Counterclaim, para. 2. ) 
3. The Answer and Counterclaim filed by Mickelson makes no 
reference to lien foreclosure. (R. 11. ) 
4. Mickelson provided labor, materials and equipment for 
the construction and improvement of the Comtel Building, from 
August 15, 1985 until June 10, 1986, at which time work was 
suspended by Mickelson . . . " (F. F. 6, R. 580. ) (As discussed 
in Part I, the June 10, 1986 date is disputed.) 
21 
5. Mickelson' s contract was with Heritage, the owner of 
the property. (R. 106. ) 
6. Mickelson' s lien was recorded on August 21, 1986. 
(F. F. 9, R. 581. ) 
7. Mickelson' s motion for leave to amend its counterclaim 
to allege lien foreclosure against Diehl was filed on February 
26, 1988, (R. 312). 
In addition to the summary of dates at page 11, supra, the 
following date is significant. 
February 1, 1988 motion for leave to amend 
counterclaim to foreclose lien 
against Diehl filed (R. 312. ) 
U.C.A. §38-1-11 sets forth two separate obligations which a 
foreclosing lien claimant must meet in a timely manner: 1) the 
first sentence requires that the claimant commence his court 
action within 12 months after a) the completion of the "original 
contract" or b) the suspension of work thereunder for 30 days; 
2) the second sentence of 38-1-11 requires that the claimant file 
a lis pendens within the same period and provides further that 
the filing of this lis pendens is not required as to parties who 
have actual knowledge of an action having been commenced. 
No claim is made by appellant in this action regarding the 
lis pendens. 
The one year limitation set forth in §38-1-11 is 
jurisdictional. It differs from a pure statute of limitations in 
that it qualifies the right as well as the remedy. It measures 
the lifetime of a statutorily created remedy. Therefore, at the 
22 
time the year expired, Mickelson's "rights and remedies under the 
[lien] statute are extinguished. " A.A. A. Fencing Co. v. 
Raintree Development, 714 P. 2d 289 (Utah 1986). 
At the time this action began, Diehl Lumber was the record 
owner of the property. (R. 4, 441. ) As such, they were a 
necessary party to the foreclosure action. Houser v. Smith, 56 
Pac. 683 (Utah 1899); Ballard v. Lawyers Title of Ariz. . 552 P. 2d 
455 (Ariz.App. 1976). Prior to February of 1988, Diehl was not a 
party to the foreclosure action. Because of the unique nature of 
mechanics liens, Mickelson's attempted amendment of his 
counterclaim in February, 1988 to seek lien foreclosure for the 
first time as against Diehl could not relate back to any prior 
pleading against Diehl. United Pacific Insurance Co. v. 
Cottonwood Properties, Inc. , 750 P. 2d 907 at 908 (Ariz. App. 
1987) (amended complaint adding lien foreclosure count on same 
facts as original complaint does not relate back under Rule 15); 
Union Tank & Pipe Co. v. Mammoth, 25 P. 2d 262 (Cal.App. 1933). 
This conclusion finds particular applicability in Utah 
because of the AAA Fencing Co. , supra, 715 P. 2d at 290, case 
which adopts a view of lien extinguishment identical to that 
discussed in United Pacific, supra. Indeed, the AAA Fencing Co. 
case is cited by the Arizona court on the issue of 
exti ngui s hment. 
Prior to the time Mickelson sought to foreclose his lien 
against Diehl, Mickelson had clearly proceeded to determine its 
title to the personal property through replevin proceedings. In 
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fact, an order (R. 43) was entered by the court on December 26, 
1986, granting a prejudgment writ of replevin. Mickelson' s 
conduct manifested a conscious choice not to foreclose its lien 
as against Diehl. His apparent change of mind in February, 1988 
was untimely. By February, 1988, under any interpretation of the 
facts regarding last work on suspension, Mickelson' s lien had 
long since expired. 
As a matter of law, the foreclosure proceedings against 
Diehl were untimely because the lien had been extinguished as a 
matter of law, and the amended claim to foreclose against Diehl 
should have been dismissed. Furthermore, because Mickelson' s 
lien action as against Diehl (the fee owner) was barred, 
Mickelson is not entitled to foreclose his lien against the 
property. Ballard, supra. 
Ill 
MICKELSON' S WORK WAS NOT LI ENABLE. 
Not all work performed on property is lienable. Tripp v. 
Vaughn, 747 P. 2d 1051 (Utah App. 1987). In distinguishing 
between real and personal property for lien purposes, the Utah 
Supreme Court has adopted a tripartite test giving consideration 
to annexation, adaption and intent on the part of owner to make 
the work a permanent part of the realty. Paul Mueller Co. v. 
Cache Valley Dairy Ass' n. , 657 P. 2d 1279 (Utah 1982). 
The facts relevant to this issue are as follows: 
(a) At trial, Mickelson testified that all of the 
items on Trial Exhibit 24 were readily removable and were not 
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fixtures. He testified further that the light fixtures which he 
installed were readily removable simply by unplugging and 
unclasping them. (T. 97, 98; R. 86 is similar to Exhibit 24. ) 
(b) At trial, Mickelson's position was that "this 
property never became fixtures because of the contract between 
Heritage and Mr. Mickelson. " (T. 54. ) 
(c) No other evidence was presented during the trial 
on the issue of annexation, adaptation or intent. 
Mickelson's original counterclaim sought to replevy 
virtually all of the materials he installed. (R. 11, 17. ) He 
filed a motion for a prejudgment writ of replevin asserting that 
he had installed "various items of personal property and 
fixtures" into the property. (R. 21. ) Over vigorous objections, 
the writ was granted and Diehl was required to post a redelivery 
bond. (R. 111. ) 
It is hornbook law that the burden of proof on the issue of 
whether the work or material was lienable fell on Mickelson. The 
issue of whether the work was lienable was squarely before the 
court, having been plead as a defense and being the first issue 
addressed in appellant7 s trial brief. In response to the issue, 
the only evidence presented by Mickelson which addressed the 
tripartite test in Mueller was that the equipment was readily 
removable. In large part, it could be removed by unplugging and 
unclasping. This undisputed evidence is contrary to any implied 
finding of annexation. 
The trial court determined early on that the equipment was 
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subject to a writ of replevin, manifesting the court's own belief 
based on Mickelson' s affidavits that the property was indeed 
personalty. 
In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass7 n. . 657 P. 2d 
1279 (Utah 1982) the supreme court upheld a determination that 
removable whey drying equipment which the lien claimant had 
installed was not a fixture and not lienable. The Mueller case 
was based upon an earlier Utah decision, King Brothers v. Utah 
Dry Kiln, 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P. 2d 254 (1962), where the supreme 
court observed that for a lien to attach: 
" [I]t is necessary there be an annexation to 
the land, or to some permanent structure upon 
it, so that the materials in question can be 
properly regarded as having become a part of 
the realty; or a fixture appurtenant to it 
(374 P. 2d at 256. ) 
In Mueller, the installation which was determined to be non-
lienable was a whey dryer attached to ducts, wiring, welding and 
bolted to the floor. The supreme court affirmed the trial courts 
decision that the whey dryer was personal and not lienable. 
In Daniger v. Hunter, 251 P. 2d 353 (Cal. 1952), the 
California court recognized that equipment such as stoves and 
electrical appliances, which can be disconnected primarily by 
pulling a plug or unscrewing a plug, are not lienable. 
On this threshold issue of whether the work was lienable, 
the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
Based upon Mickelson' s own uncontradicted testimony, the 
materials on Exhibit 24 were readily removable and were not 
fixtures. There being no evidence on any of the other factors 
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necessary to prove lienable work, and where no other conclusion 
can be drawn, the trial court erred in its apparent conclusion 
that Mickelson' s work was lienable. 
IV. 
THE UTAH MECHANICS LIEN STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The mechanics lien at issue was recorded in August, 1986. 
The Utah mechanics lien statute has been amended several times in 
recent years. Appellant contends that the mechanics lien 
statute, U. C. A. §38-1-1, as it existed in August 1986, was 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The determination of this issue requires a consideration of 
i) whether the Utah mechanics lien statute provides 
constitutional due process safeguards, and ii) whether the 
attachment of a lien affects a constitutionally significant 
property interest. The analysis of these issues springs from 
four cases decided by the United States Supreme Court: Sniadach 
v. Family Finance Corp. , 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 
407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. , 416 U.S. 600 
(1974); and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. , 419 
U.S. 601 (1975). 
These cases discuss and present due process concepts as 
applied to prejudgment remedies. The Maryland Court of Appeals, 
in Barry Properties v. Fick Brothers Roofing Co. , 277 Md. 15, 353 
A. 2d 222 (1976), while considering the same issues as presented 
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in this appeal, made the following summation with respect to the 
Supreme Court decisions: 
"What we glean from Sniadach. Fuentes, 
Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing is that, 
lacking extraordinary circumstances, 
statutory prejudgment creditor remedies which 
even temporarily deprive a debtor of a 
significant property interest without notice 
and an opportunity for a prior probable-
cause-type hearing are, as held in Fuentes, 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process clause unless 
safeguards such as those mentioned in 
Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing are 
present and even then, although this is less 
clear, the law may be invalid if the issues 
underlying the seizure are not -susceptible to 
uncomplicated documentary proof or if the 
creditor does not have a present interest in 
the property seized." 353 A. 2d at 231. 
A. The Utah mechanics lien statute provides no due process 
protection. 
The Utah lien statute, §38-1-1, et seq. , does not require 
any of the following: 
a) that the lien be signed or verified under 
oath as to its truthfulness; 
b) that there be any notice to the owner of the 
intent to file, or of the filing of the lien 
(unless the lien claimant seeks costs and 
attorneys' fees); 
c) an opportunity for the owner or the claimant 
to be heard at any meaningful time or in any 
meaningful manner either prior to or 
subsequent to the attachment of the lien; 
d) any requirement for any protection for the 
property owner if the lien is unsupportable; 
e) any supervision or control by any judicial 
officer in the filing of the lien (the lien 
attaches entirely without judicial action); 
f) the lien is not required to state the amount 
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claimed or for what work or materials it is 
claimed; 
Prior to 1985, the Utah mechanics lien statute required that 
liens be verified under oath. The significance of this 
requirement was recognized on several occasions by the Utah 
Supreme Court in First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 
919 (Utah 1981) and Graff v. Boise Cascade, 660 P. 2d 721 (Utah 
1983). The removal of this requirement meant that a claimant or 
his authorized agent could file a lien without any requirement 
that its truthfulness be sworn to. Although Mickelson' s lien 
was "subscribed and sworn to, " the fact does not affect the 
constitutionality of the statute. 
In the First Security, supra, case, the Utah Supreme Court 
relied heavily upon a decision of the Alaska Supreme Court, 
H. A. M. S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P. 2d 
258 (Alaska 1977) also 566 P. 2d 1012, which considered and 
discussed the reasons why a lien must be verified. The Alaska 
court, while observing that verification was statutorily 
required, considered that verification was also constitutionally 
mandated: (563 P. 2d at 263) 
...we think a construction of AS 
34.35.070(c)(5), which requires that the 
claim of lien be verified by the oath of the 
claimant or other person having knowledge of 
the fact is essential to the existence of the 
lien, is mandated. (Fn. 16-such an 
interpretation is in line with our decisions 
zThe 1989 amendment to §38-1-7 adds a requirement that a 
lien be acknowledged for recording, but specifically removes any 
such requirement for the time period involved in this action. 
Mickelson's lien was "subscribed and sworn to." 
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requiring due process notification and 
opportunity to be heard in prejudgment 
attachment cases...It takes notice of the 
necessary balance between claims of lien and 
due process requirements inherent in 
unliquidated claims of lien filed against 
real property. ) Given the significant 
impact that the filing of a lien claim can 
have against the owner of the subject 
property, we think that strong policy reasons 
underly the legislature' s determination that 
claims of lien must be verified. We think 
the requirement of verificant [sic] is 
reflective of the legislature' s awareness 
that a claim of lien adversely affects the 
title to the property and its alienability; 
that the claim of lien can have an injurious 
impact on the credit of the owner of the 
property which is subject to the lien; and 
that the claim of lien can be used as a 
vehicle to coerce settlement from the owner 
of the property. In light of these very 
important policy considerations there exists 
a very reasonable basis for the legislature' s 
determination that the significance of filing 
a lien claim be made clear to the lien 
claimant through the requirement of 
verification and the possibility of perjury 
prosecution for verifying a false lien claim. 
The absence of a verification requirement in the Utah act 
flies in the face of the United States Supreme Court cases and 
results in the total absence of due process on the most basic 
issue - the truthfulness of the claim. This absence is magnified 
in Utah by the fact that a lis pendens, the notice required by 
statute to other claimants, is itself a privileged document, 
again without oath. As such, liens can be recorded and 
foreclosure proceedings commenced without the claimant ever 
having to swear to the truthfulness of his lien. 
The second due process defect in the Utah statute is that 
the lien can attach without notice to the owner. (U.C.A. §38-1-
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7(3) requires the notice to be mailed after filing, and if it is 
not mailed, only the right to recover fees and costs is 
affected. ) This absence of notice can result in liens being 
recorded years before the owner has any notice. For example, an 
excavation subcontractor could complete work in the first month 
of a two year project, be unpaid, file his lien right away (or 
wait until the "original contract" is completed two years 
later), and wait the 2 years until the project is completed plus 
the one year allowed in §38-1-11 before suing to foreclose. As 
such, property could be encumbered for many years without actual 
or record notice to the owner. Notice goes to the very heart of 
due process. 
The Utah statute provides no opportunity for a liened 
property owner to be heard at a meaningful time or in a 
meaningful manner. In Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco 
Masons/ Sup. , 362 A. 2d 778 (Conn. 1975), vacated and remanded 423 
U.S. 809 (1975) (for determination of whether decision was based 
on federal or state grounds), reaffirmed, Conn. 365 A. 2d 393 
(1975); cert. den. 429 U.S. 889 (1976), the Connecticut Supreme 
Court considered the significance of a hearing as a 
constitutional safeguard in the mechanics lien process, and 
stated: 
"For more than a century, the central meaning 
of procedural due process has been clear. 
' Parties whose rights are to be affected are 
entitled to be heard; and in order that they 
may enjoy that right they must first be 
notified. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U. S. 223, 233 
(citations omitted) It is equally 
fundamental that the right to notice and an 
31 
opportunity to be heard ' must be granted at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. ' 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 
S. Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62. (362 A. 2d at 
781) 
The Connecticut court reviewed the crucial role that a hearing 
played in the U. S. Supreme Court cases, supra, observing that 
while there was no requirement of a hearing prior to the filing, 
there was clearly a requirement for an "early hearing. " 362 A. 2d 
at 782. At the same time, the Connecticut court distinguished 
an Arizona case, Spielman-Ford, Inc. v. Hanson's, 379 F. Supp. 997 
(D.Ariz) aff'd w. o. opin. 417 U.S. 901 (1974), on the basis that 
Arizona limited the validity of a lien to a mere six (6) months 
unless an action was brought to foreclose. In Utah, however, the 
time to foreclose could extend for a minimum of one year, and as 
discussed supra, could actually be several years old before any 
proceeding is commenced, and several more years before any 
hearing could be had. 
In Roundhouse, supra, the Connecticut Supreme Court held 
that the absence of any statutory provision for a meaningful 
hearing deprived owners of their constitutional rights to due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment and a due process clause 
of the state constitution. In Utah, as in Connecticut, there is 
no statutory requirement for any constitutionally meaningful 
hearing. 
Each of the United States Supreme Court decisions, Fuentes, 
Sniadach, Mitchell, and North Georgia, supra, refer to the 
significance of a bond as a measure of protection to the owner. 
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The Utah lien statute has no bond requirement. 
These constitutional shortcomings become even more apparent 
when the mechanics lien statute is compared to the Rule 64A 
procedures for prejudgment relief. Rule 64A, U. R. C. P. , provides 
all of the constitutional safeguards for a debtor - notice, 
immediate hearing, etc. For example, to obtain a prejudgment 
writ of replevin, as did Mickelson in this case, an evidentiary 
hearing is conducted promptly, a bond required of the claimant, 
and the debtor has the right to retain the property by posting 
his own bond. Claims for garnishment or attachment of the 
smallest amount are required to meet constitutional safeguards. 
In lien proceedings, there is no preattachment hearing or any 
hearing at all prior to trial, no right in the property owner to 
bond over over the lien, no requirement that the claimant provide 
a bond, and no judicial determination of probable entitlement. 
While all of the procedural safeguards exist in Rule 64A 
proceedings even for small claims, property worth, in this case, 
hundreds of thousands of dollars can be encumbered by liens with 
no safeguards. 
Any one of the due process deficiencies which exist in the 
Utah statute is in itself, sufficient to invalidate the statute. 
Some states have upheld their mechanics lien statutes against due 
process attacks. None, however, (to our knowledge) have had the 
broad range of constitutional defects which exist in the Utah 
scheme, and are distinguishable on that basis alone. None have 
recognized the broad range of property interests protected by 
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their state7 s constitution' s due process clause. Even the 
Connecticut statute which was struck down in Roundhouse, supra, 
required that the amount of the lien be stated, an additional 
safeguard not found in Utah. When considered as a whole, the 
deficiencies are overwhelming and provide no measure of 
procedural due process to owners of liened property. 
Applied to this case, Mickelson' s lien, while verified, 
contained no verification of the amount claimed. Mickelson' s own 
testimony attempted to contradict the verification of the last 
date of work. None of the other procedural safeguards mandated 
by the constitution existed. The lien and Mickelson' s conduct 
with regard to it have resulted in a denial of due process to the 
property owners. 
B. The attachment of a mechanics lien is a taking of 
property sufficient in impose due process requirements. It is 
significant that the "taking" of property need not be total. As 
the United States Supreme Court observed in Fuentes, supra, "Any 
significant taking of property by the state is within the 
purview of the Due Process Clause. " 407 U. S. at 86. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 
85 P. 2d 608, 610 (Utah 1938) considered Article I, Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution and made the following observation: 
The word "property" although in common 
parlance applied to a tract of land or a 
chattel, to a physical thing, means in its 
legal signification only the rights of the 
owner in relation to it. Property is the 
right of any person to possess, use, enjoy 
and dispose of a thing. The term "property" 
is often used to indicate the res, or subject 
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of the property rather than the property 
itself. Rianev v. Chicago, 102 111. 64, 77. 
"The words ' life' , ' liberty' , and ' property' 
are constitutional terms, and are to be taken 
in their broadest sense. They indicate the 
three great subdivisions of all civil right. 
The term ' property' , in this clause, embraces 
all valuable interests which a man may 
possess outside of himself; that is to say, 
outside of his life and liberty. It is not 
confined to mere tangible property but 
extends to every species of vested right", 
(citations omitted) I_c|. 
Clearly Utah has adopted a broad definition of the term 
"property" in considering cases under Article 1, Section 7. 
In Utah, as elsewhere, mechanic' s liens exist in derogation 
of the common law and are purely a right created by statute. A 
lien, when filed in Utah, "...creates an encumbrance on property 
that deprives the owner of his ability to convey clear title and 
impairs his credit. " First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 
P. 2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981). A lien filed in Utah, by statute, 
attaches to the interest of the owner from the date of first work 
on the project by anyone, not just the claimant. U. C. A. §38-1-3, 
38-1-5. A lien is given statutory priority over mortgages or 
other interests which are recorded after the date of first work 
even though no record notice of the lien may have been filed by 
the lien claimant at the time the mortgage or other interest is 
recorded. U. C. A. §38-1-5. 
While some courts have found that a taking of property does 
not result from the filing of a lien, Spielman-Ford, Inc. v. 
Hanson' s Inc. . 379 F. Supp. 997 (D.Ariz), aff'd w. o. opin. , 417 
U.S. 901 (1974), these cases are readily distinguishable based 
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upon the Utah statutory scheme and prior Utah case law. 
The better reasoned decisions have concluded that the 
attachment of a mechanic' s lien does involve the taking of a 
constitutionally significant property interest. In Barry 
Properties v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co. , 353 A. 2d 222 (Md. 1976), 
the Maryland Supreme Court invalidated the Maryland mechanic' s 
lien statute. Rejecting the " de minimus" argument, the court 
held that because the property owner was prevented from either 
closing a permanent mortgage or obtaining a second mortgage on 
the property' s equity as a result of a perfected mechanic' s lien, 
such restriction constituted a significant interference with the 
owner' s property rights. The court reasoned: 
Although possession will not be wrested from 
the owner until a purchaser acquires title 
through a foreclosure sale and the owner can 
still legally alienate or further encumber 
the property until that time, in reality, 
since he no longer has unfettered title, not 
only will it be extremely difficult for him 
to do so, but additionally his equity will be 
diminished to the extent of the lien. . . 
Consequently, in light of the effect a 
Maryland mechanic' s lien has on property, we 
conclude that an owner is deprived of a 
"significant property interest" when a lien 
is imposed and thus, the limitations of due 
process are applicable. Id,, at 228. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Roundhouse Construction 
Corp. v. Telesco Masons' Supply Co. , supra, in holding that the 
statutory procedure governing Connecticut' s mechanic' s liens was 
unconstitutional, determined that the property interest involved 
was significant in that the recording of a mechanic's lien 
severely restricts the opportunity for and the possibility of 
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alienation of the property. 
In H, A, M. S, v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska, supra, 563 
P. 2d at 263, the court focused on the fact that a lien adversely 
affects title and alienability, that it has an injurious impact 
on credit, and that it can be used as a vehicle to coerce 
settlement. As discussed previously, the Utah Supreme Court in 
the First Security case, supra, has already adopted and agreed 
with much of the reasoning of the H. A. M. S. case. 
There can be little question but that the recording of a 
lien affects many of the bundle of rights that emanate from the 
ownership of property. At a minimum, an owner or lender knows 
that a lawsuit will likely follow with an unknown result. It is 
the unknown, as much as the claim itself, that affects the 
property. 
In other cases, liens can be filed by subcontractors to 
coerce owners or general contractors into paying higher amounts 
than may be owed simply because of the spectre the lien creates 
and the absence of any efficient, meaningful way to remove the 
lien short of a trial, and a trial which may be years away. 
Applied to this case, a property worth hundreds of thousands 
of dollars was affected and remained affected for years by a lien 
worth only a small percentage of the overall value of the 
property. Yet, the lien interest is so significant that, if 
successful, Mickelson can actually divest ownership. 
The filing of a lien results in a significant taking of 
property. 
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The Utah Mechanics Lien Statute is unconstitutional on its 
face. Mickelson' s lien, in particular, resulted in a deprivation 
of a significant property interest to Diehl without any due 
process protection. It would be constitutionally impermissible 
to permit Mickelson' s lien to attach to the property, as 
contemplated in §38-1-5, absent due process safeguards. 
CONCLUSION 
For each of the foregoing reasons, the decision of Judge 
Sawaya should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of Zions 
and Diehl. The cause should be remanded- for a determination and 
award of fees to appellants. 
DATED this / / day of July, 1989. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Diehl Lumber 
Transportation, Inc. and 
Zions First National Bank 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that 
copies of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
I / day of July, 1989 to the following: 
M. Richard Walker 
M. Richard Walker & Associates 
Attorney for Mickelson 
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
da/Titledhl. brf 
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WHS* M C O * M D » MAIL TOi 
M. Richard Walker 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
wmj^' 
NOTICE OF LIEN 
*-* T- £, 
GLENN'S SERVICE COMPANY, pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
Section 38-1-1, et.seq., hereby gives notice of a lien c 
and held against the following described real property, s 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point 1574.07 feet South and 362.28 
feet West from the Northeast corner of Section 12, 
Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian, running thence South 35 deg. 09,23M West 
452.68 feet; thence Southwesterly 215.69 feet alon g 
the arc of a 369.26 foot raduis curve to the right 
(Chord bears South 51 deg. 53'28" West 212.63 feet); 
thence Northwesterly 377.97 feet along the arc of a 
2914.73 foot radius curve to the left (Chord bears 
North 12 deg. 21'24w East 377.71 feet); thence North 8 
deg 57f31" East 37.06 feet, thence North 5 deg. 48,05" 
East 107.96 feet; thece North 29 deg. 41" East 43.14 
feet; thence South 73 deg. 52l58w East 38.58 feet; 
thence South 54 deg. 13'29" East 128.50 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Reputed/Record owner: Heritage Corporation 
Labor/Material provided to: Heritage Corporation 
First Labor/Material provided on or about: 08/15/85 
Last Labor/Material provided on or about: 05/15/86 
otated 
laimed 
ituate 
DATED this 3/ day of August, 1986. 
CLAIMANT: 
J£ M ic 
i 
Glenn's Service Company 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
By: ^ leng^j'. tficfcelson 
Owner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this jtm ' I 9 8 6-
Residing at: \ ( U1 7 
: • ^Z i CD • •*" t 
NOT/iRY PUBLIC 
M. Rloh«rd W « l k # r 
Bar No. 3362 
M. RICHARD WALKER & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 278-4747 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIEHL LUMBER TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
) NUNC PRO TUNC 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER 
vs. ) 
GLEN J. MICKELSON dba ) 
GLEN'S SERVICE COMPANY, ) 
Defendant, ) Judge: Sawaya 
GLEN J. MICKELSON dba 
GLEN'S SERVICE COMPANY, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. ) Civil No. C86-8213 
HERITAGE CORPORATION, a Utah ) 
corporation, COMTEL, a Utah ) 
corporation, AMERICAN WEST MORTGAGE ) 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, ) 
ZION'S FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a Utah ) 
corporation, and FAR WEST ) 
SAVINGS & LOAN, ) 
Third Party Defendants. ) 
************************************************ 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
the 29th day of June, 1987, pursuant to Defendant's Motion for 
Leave to File Third Party Complaint, and the Court being fully 
NOV 2 5 1987 
• I O T P 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant is hereby granted to amej)d 
and f i l e t h e Th ird Pa-rty C o m p l a i n t h e r e i n . ; ^ / f e ^ ( ^ ci$ of dj/JL ef fi/cv-c 
DATED t h i s A ^ day of //fr?/" ' , 1 9 8 7 . 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. EXXON H1NDLEY _ 
^ ^ ^
 Ctof>
 i^ JAMES S." SAWAYA 
^ • O V ^ A / D i s t r i c t Judge 
0«(ptity Oerk 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this day of , 1987, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER, 
postage prepaid, in the United States mail, to the following: 
Randy B. Coke 
Attorney at Law 
BEASLIN, BYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Secretary 
- 2 -
A ' ^ 1 
m o\<S-v^ ». ^ i ^ ^ 0 ^ j c J L ^ < C A S E NO: Sm C ? ~ ^ ^ - - C S 2 / c ^ 
Annul. Type of hearing: Div. 
P. Atty: r n ^ n k j J i r J UAJL,H^r^^/^ 
D. Atty: _Nk 
Sworn & Examined: 
Pltf: 
Others: 
Supp. Order, OSC. Other, 
Summons, 
Waiver 
Deft:. 
St ipulat ion. 
Publ ica t ion. 
• Default of Pltf/Deft E n j e r e c L - ^ 
Dat^F^^UYN^l OR > &$1 
Judge; 
Clerk:" 
Reporter: 
Bailiff: _ 
> ^ S c t U j C ^ \ Q y ^ 
VJN^M^ 
ORDERS: 
• Custody Evaluation Ordered 
• Visitation Rights 
• Custody Awarded To 
n 
• 
n 
• 
n 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:, 
Atty. fees to the 
Home To: 
_ 
_ Per Month/Year 
_ in the amount of _ 
Per Month 
• Alimony Waived 
• Deferred 
• Furnishings To: 
• Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
• Restraining Order Entered Against 
. Automobile To: 
• Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_ 
• 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
!~J Divorce Granted To As 
• Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry 
• Former Name of 
LJ 3-Month Interlocutory 
Is Restored 
• Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft. 
Returnable Bai l . 
• Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
• B§sed on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counseL court orders B^sed on written stipulation of respective counsel/ otion or naint ip s counseL coun oraers 
mT —> ° 
M. Richard Walker 
Bar No. 3362 
M. RICHARD WALKER & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 278-4747 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIEHL LUMBER TRANSPORTATION, INC., 
Plaintiff, ] 
v s . ] 
GLENN J. MICKELSON dba 
GLENN'S SERVICE COMPANY, ] 
Defendant, 
GLENN J. MICKELSON dba ] 
GLENN'S SERVICE COMPANY, ] 
Third Party Plaintiff, ! 
vs. 
HERITAGE CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, COMTEL, a Utah 
corporation, AMERICAN WEST 
MORTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah ] 
corporation, ZIONS FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK, a Utah corporation, 
and FAR WEST SAVINGS & LOAN, 
Third Party Defendants. 
1 AMENDED 
> FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Judge: Sawaya 
' Civil No. C86-8213 
************************************************************ 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial before 
the above entitled Court on the 23rd day of August, 1988, the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge, presiding, the 
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants being present and 
represented by their attorneys, Richard A. Rappaport and Keith W. 
Meade, and the Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, Glenn Mickelson, 
being present in person and represented by his attorney, M. 
Richard Walker, and the matter having been fully tried, 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 6 1989 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
tty X,( .^J^vS]^L\ J* 
presented, argued and submitted and the Court being fully advised 
in the premises, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That this action involves the construction of a building 
located at 57 West Vine Street, Murray, Utah, referred to as the 
"Comtel Building". 
2. The "Comtel Building" was constructed by Heritage 
Corporation (HERITAGE) as owner and general contractor, on behalf 
of Comtel, Inc., the Lessee of the premises, for whom the 
building was being constructed. That HERITAGE, as buyer, 
acquired the property on a Uniform Real Estate Contract from the 
Redevelopment Agency of Murray City, dated August 7, 1985, 
recorded August 28, 1985, in Book 5685 at Page 1870. 
3. The construction financing was obtained by HERITAGE from 
American West Mortgage Corporation, who secured the funding by 
virtue of a Trust Deed dated March 29, 1985, and recorded As 
Entry No. 4069667. 
4. On the same date of March 29, 1985, American West 
Mortgage Corporation assigned its interest in the Trust Deed to 
Far West Savings and Loan, said assignment being recorded April 
12, 1985 as Entry No. 4072966 at Book 5644, Page 2959. 
5. The Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, MICKELSON, was 
hired by HERITAGE to provide electrical materials, labor and 
equipment (in the construction of the COMTEL BUILDING), purusant 
to a written subcontract agreement dated June 24, 1985. 
6. MICKELSON provided labor, materials and equipment for 
the construction and improvement of the COMTEL BUILDING, from 
August 15, 1985 until June 10, 1986, at which time work was 
suspended by MICKELSON, based upon the fact that the 
Owner/General Contractor (HERITAGE) had failed to make payment of 
the obligations due and owing under the Subcontract Agreement. 
7. That at the time of suspension of work on June 10, 1986, 
there remained due and owing to MICKELSON the sum of $27,026.46. 
8. That on or about the 3rd day of June, 1986, the said Far 
West Savings and Loan, filed for record its Notice of Default and 
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Election of Sale, recorded as Entry No. 4255556 at Book 5774, 
Page 1623. 
9. That on or about the 21st day of August, 1986, the said 
MICKELSON filed for record his Notice of Lien recorded as Entry 
No. 4299656 at Book 5806, Page 49. 
10. That thereafter on September 5, 1986, the said Far West 
Savings and Loan, gave its Notice of Trustee's Sale, scheduling 
the sale of the property at Trustee's Sale on October 7, 1986. 
11. That thereafter on or about October 8, 1986, Zions 
First National Bank (ZIONS) purchased the interest of Far West 
Savings and Loan, as recorded on the public records of Salt Lake 
County as Entry No. 4328646 and 4328647. 
12. That on or about the 27th day of October, 1986, the 
Plaintiff (DIEHL) puchased the property (COMTEL BUILDING) from 
ZIONS, and DIEHL claims to be the owner of the property referred 
to as the COMTEL BUILDING. 
13. The construction of the COMTEL BUILDING was basically 
completed on July 17, 1986, except as to work suspended for 
failure to pay. 
14. In November 1984, the Owner/General Contractor, 
HERITAGE, retained the architect, Robert Tuttle, who in December 
1984, completed the "design development plot plan, floor plans, 
elevations and presentation drawings", delivering the same to 
HERITAGE prior to January 18, 1985. 
15. That prior to January 16, 1985, DeMass & Associates 
completed the boundary survey of the property and rough-staking 
of the site for the building, using bright orange and yellow 
flags, for the purpose of identifying the building site so that 
excavation and leveling of the building site could be done by Bay 
Construction. 
16. That in January 1985 HERITAGE hired Bay Construction to 
excavate and rough grade the building site for the COMTEL 
BUILDING. 
17. That on approximately January 15, 1985, pursuant to his 
agreement with HERITAGE, Byron Young (BAY Construction) brought 
onto the "Comtel" job site a large D-8 Cat, with which he 
3 
OG0581 
commenced work on the project, excavating and grading a level 
platform the approximate size of the building to rough grade, 
upon which the building was to be built. 
18. That as part of the work, Bay Construction "ripped" the 
slag on the site, cutting approximately 3-4 feet deep on the 
north end and filling with the excess on the South end of the 
building site, working the D-8 Cat 19 3/4 hours and billing 
approximately $2,000.00 for the work completed. 
19. That the Owner/General Contractor (HERITAGE) considered 
the work by Bay Construction to be the commencement of 
construction, and knew that it was done before the Trust Deed in 
favor of American West Mortgage Corporation was recorded, but did 
so because of the availability of Bay Construction to work, and 
the time contraints imposed by his permanent financing lender. 
20. That the leveled "platform" for the building and the 
survey stakes with "orange and yellow flagging" were existing and 
clearly observable at the date on which American West Mortgage 
Corporation recorded its Trust Deed on March 29, 1985. 
21. On June 12, 1987, the Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, 
MICKELSON, filed its Verified Third Party Complaint, seeking to 
foreclose its lien. 
22. That leave of Court to file the Third Party Complaint 
was given by stipulation of the Plaintiff's attorney and a 
subsequently signed Nunc Pro Tunc Order of the Court. At the 
time of filing of said Third Party Complaint, the Plaintiff, 
DIEHL, was the only other party to the action. 
23. That the matters and issues tried and considered by the 
Court are claims alleged by Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, 
MICKELSON, in his Third Party Complaint claiming: 
a. A valid lien on real property for labor and material 
furnished. The critical issue being priority of the claimed lien 
over the trust deed, which was foreclosed and the interest 
thereunder assigned to Third Party Defendant Zions First National 
Bank. The date of commencement of construction being the 
dispositve issue, and Third Party Plaintiff claiming that the 
commencement to do work or furnish materials as predating the 
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date of recording the trust deed. 
b. A right to remove material installed in the building 
pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement between Third Party 
Plaintiff and the contractor, HERITAGE, which provided that 
Plaintiff retains title to materials installed and a right to 
remove same if not paid in full. 
24. The Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, MICKELSON, claims 
for attorney's fees under the lien law, and it was stipulated at 
the conclusion of the trial that if Third Party Plaintiff was 
successful, attorney's fees could be submitted on affidavit 
subject to cross examination, by the Third Party Defendants. 
25. That the Third Party Plaintiff by affidavit claims 
pursuant to UCA 1953 §38-1-17, that a reasonable attorney's fee 
is the amount of $9,450,00. 
The Court having made it Findings of Fact, does hereby make 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Third Party Plaintiff, MICKELSON, pursuant to a 
written subcontract with the Owner/General Contractor, Heritage 
Corporation, provided labor and materials in the construction, 
building and improvement upon the land locally known as the 
Comtel Building, located at 57 West Vine Street, and more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 1574.07 feet South and 
362.28 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 12, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, running thence South 
35o09'23,, West 452.68 feet; thence Southwesterly 
215.69 feet along the arc of a 369.26 foot 
radius curve to the right (Chord bears South 
51053'28" West 212.63 feet); thence 
Northeasterly 377.97 feet along the arc of a 
2914.73 foot radius curve to the left (Chord 
bears North 12°21'24n East 377.71 feet); thence 
North 8°57'31" East 37.06 feet, thence North 
5°48'05" East 107.96 feet; thence North 29°41' 
East 43.14 feet; thence South 73°52'58" East 
38.58 feet; thence South 54°13'29,t East 128.50 
feet to the point of beginning. 
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2. That there remains due and owing to Third Party 
Plaintiff for said labor and materials the sum of $27,026,46 
3. That the lien filed by the Third Party Plaintiff, 
MICKELSON, is' a valid and legal lien as provided in Title 38, 
Chapter 1, UCA 1953, as amended. 
4. That the Third Party Plaintiff suspended work on the 
Comtel Building on June 10, 1986, because the Owner/General 
Contractor (HERITAGE) failed to pay the amounts past due and 
owing to the Third Party Plaintiff, 
5. That the last work for which a lien was filed, was done 
by Third Party Plaintiff on or about May 19, 1986, although other 
work was performed up to June 10, 1986. 
6. That the Third Party Plaintiff timely filed its Notice 
of Lien on or about August 21, 1986, and within 100 days after 
furnishing the last labor or materials as required under §38-1-7 
UCA 1953, as amended. 
7. That the Third Party Plaintiff timely commenced an 
action to enforce its lien: 
"within twelve months after the completion of 
the original contract, or the suspension of work 
thereunder for a period of thirty days." 
as provided in §38-1-11 UCA 1953, as amended. 
8. That the work performed on January 16, 1985, by Bay 
Construction satisfied the requirement of the statute, §38-1-5 
UCA 1953, as amended, as being the "commencement to do work or 
furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement". 
9. That the Third Party Plaintiff's lien relates back to 
and takes effect as of the time work was commenced on January 16, 
1985, and has priority over the Trust Deed of American West 
Mortgage Corporation as assigned to Far West Savings and Loan; 
has priority over the interests of Zions First National Bank who 
acquired the property through the Trustee's Sale; and has 
priority over the interests of Diehl Lumber and Transporation, 
Inc. who acquired the property from Zions First National Bank. 
10. Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to the right to 
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foreclose the mechanics lien claimed as prayed. 
11. Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the 
proceeds of the foreclosure sale the following: 
a. Principal - $27,026.46. 
b. Interest at 10% per annum from the date of each 
unpaid invoice to the date of Judgment in the amount of 
$7,719.63. 
c. For attorney's fees of $9,450.00. 
d. For costs of court in the amount of $732.10. 
e. Any amounts derived from the sale over and above the 
above amounts should be paid to the Clerk of the Court, for the 
use and benefit of the Plaintiff or the Third Party Defendant, 
Zions First National Bank, as their interests may appear. 
12. That the Third Party Defendant's title retaining 
agreement does not satisfy the requirements of the statute and no 
valid security interest was created by the same therefore Third 
Party Defendant should not hajz^ the right to remove personal 
property from the premises. 
DATED this J^?/£ day nfJ^^mU*~>r 1 9 8 ^ 
B) 
J^ AiJEB^ S. SAWAYA 
District Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
4 I hereby certify that on this J^H^ day of ^yOM • r 
198^ I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregbirfgfe"FTNDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, postage prepaid, in the United 
States mail, to the following: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
^cvJoOA^^^/x JLi 
Secretary 
i*o0585 
Third Judictai Diotrtct 
M. Richard Walker 
Bar No. 3362 
M. RICHARD WALKER & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 278-4747 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIEHL LUMBER TRANSPORTATION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GLENN J. MICKELSON dba 
GLENN'S SERVICE COMPANY, 
Defendant, 
GLENN J. MICKELSON dba 
GLENN'S SERVICE COMPANY, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HERITAGE CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, COMTEL, a Utah 
corporation, AMERICAN WEST 
MORTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, ZIONS FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK, a Utah corporation, 
and FAR WEST SAVINGS & LOAN, 
Third Party Defendants. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial on the 
23rd day of August, 1988, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District 
Judge, presiding, the Third Party Plaintiff being represented by 
his attorney, M. Richard Walker, and the Plaintiff and Third 
Party Defendants being represented by their attorneys, Richard A. 
Rappaport and Keith W. Meade; and the Court having considered the 
evidence and counsel having argued the case and submitted the 
same to the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the 
JAN 2 6 1989 
^. SALT LAKE COJWi Y / 
U«Lu^ Clerk 
JUDGMENT 
Judge: Sawaya 
Civil No. C86-8213 
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Ir^iOSSf 
premises and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Lawf now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed by stipulation of the 
parties. 
2. Third Party Plaintiff Mickelson's Mechanics Lien is 
deemed to be a valid and legal lien and Third Party Plaintiff, 
Mickelson, is hereby awarded the right to foreclose the 
Mechanic's Lien as prayed. 
3. That the property to be foreclosed is located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, locally known as 57 West Vine Street 
and more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 1574.07 feet South and 
362.28 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 12, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, running thence South 
35o09'23" West 452.68 feet; thence Southwesterly 
215.69 feet along the arc of a 369.26 foot 
radius curve to the right (Chord bears South 
S l ^ ^ " West 212.63 feet); thence 
Northeasterly 377.97 feet along the arc of a 
2914.73 foot radius curve to the left (Chord 
bears North 12°21'24w East 377.71 feet); thence 
North 8°57'31" East 37.06 feet, thence North 
SMS'OS" East 107.96 feet; thence North 29°41' 
East 43.14 feet; thence South 73°52'58n East 
38.58 feet; thence South 54°13'29M East 128.50 
feet to the point of beginning. 
4. That the interests the Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant's may have in the above property is inferior and 
subordinate to the Lien of the Third Party Plaintiff. 
5. The Third Party Plaintiff is granted judgment for 
$27,026.46, plus $50.00 for the costs of preparing said Lien, 
costs of Court in the sum of $732.10, together with interest 
thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of each unpaid 
invoice until the date of Judgment in the sum of $7,719.63. 
6. Third Party Plaintiff is awarded a reasonable attorney's 
fee in the sum of $9,450.00. 
7. The Sheriff of Salt Lake County is directed to forthwith 
sell the above described property pursuant to §38-1-17 UCA 1953, 
2 
as amended, and that the proceeds of said sale shall be applied 
to satisfy the above sums of money due and owing to the Third 
Party Plaintiff, Mickelson, together with the expenses of sale, 
and that the surplus, if any, be turned over to the clerk of this 
Court for the use and benefit orfr^the Third Party Defendants as 
their interest may appear, ( J) . 
DATED this *Z?/7 day of/Taa&Riwbar, 198£^ 
BY T 
S. SAWAYA 
District Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ^Z -"" day of \)GL.C^ 
1988, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, 
postage prepaid, in the United States mail, to the following: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
j^>#j\l&-aAj0L j~>^cX-£— 
Secretary 
